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Abstract
This method of modelling liquidity risk uses a “bottom-up” ap-
proach. Real bank data has been used and transformed for both ease
of use and security. Identifying the degree of liquidity risk enables
a bank to take action to avert problem areas overall and bring ac-
countability to management in individual units within the institution.
Critical problems identified include data availability—the set task is
to identify the worst 3 days in 10,000—and possible confounding with
market risk.
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1 Introduction
Banks commonly identify four specific forms of financial risk—credit risk,
operational risk, market risk and liquidity risk [1, 5]. The first three of these
have been extensively studied and are commonly incorporated into existing
capital allocation frameworks. Banks are exposed to a liquidity risk that a
large amount of depositors’ funds may be withdrawn in a short period of
time. This risk is partly confounded with market risk as depositor behaviour
can arise from perceptions of the market state—such as in a stock market
fall. Unlike the other risk factors, no technique for modelling liquidity risk
currently has wide acceptance although use of modified Value at Risk models
has been suggested [4, 3].
Liquidity risk is a risk which must be managed as it cannot be eliminated
or transferred [5]. Liquidity problems can occur in normal times as no mar-
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kets are perfectly liquid or in crisis times where the most severe outcomes
can be expected. Management of liquidity in normal times can include use
of carefully designed derivative instruments [3] as well as sensible practice on
controlling cash flows. To guard against liquidity risk a bank must hold in re-
serve sufficient funds to meet all but the most extreme possibilities. The cost
of holding these reserves has to be built into the price of a banking product.
The liquidity risk is assessed independently for each product to avoid unin-
tended subsidisation across products. In this analysis we examine a specific
banking case and review performance on four products on offer - personal
transactions, savings accounts, term deposits which are carded (those with
standard interest rates offered on fixed periods) and term deposits which are
non-carded (where the deposit is negotiated on an ad hoc basis). The specific
task was to assess the level at which the reserves would be adequate, with
a probability of 99.97%, to cover the withdrawals in a week for these four
retail banking products.
2 Data
Transaction data by amount and numbers for product and type were supplied
for each day in the period October 29, 2000 to June 30, 2001, a total of
245 days (35 weeks). Pivot tables in an Excel spreadsheet were used to
summarise the data by amount and number by type. The daily values for
the withdrawal type were used for the initial analysis.
In a real application additional data would be used by a bank to get
more accurate and reliable results. However, the data supplied is sufficient
to illustrate the method.
The time series for the working days showed a regular (weekly or fort-
nightly) cycle, interrupted at times by the incidence of public holidays. There
was some evidence of additional volumes of transactions after these holidays,
and so working with weekly data smoothed out some of these irregularities.
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3 The basic model
Suppose that in week t there are Nt withdrawals. The total withdrawals for
the week is Zt.
We assume that each Nt > 0 and Zt > 0 .
The data supplied by the bank was daily for each of Nt and Zt but these
were amalgamated to weekly data and, after the data pruning discussed, we
have the maximum t is T = 35 here. It was not possible to tell anything
about individual depositors although this might be significant with major
clients on some products like noncarded term deposits.
We find the average size of withdrawal each week is Yt where
Yt =
Zt
Nt
or, equivalently, Zt = Nt × Yt for t = 1, 2, . . . , T
The data was rescaled using average values taken over the 35 week period to
ensure that confidentiality is maintained. These average values were
N¯ =
T∑
t=1
Nt , Y¯ =
T∑
t=1
Yt , Z¯ =
T∑
t=1
Zt ,
so that we have the rescaled data, which we have named the mob Mt, the
clip Ct and the bag Bt where
Mt =
Nt
N¯
, Ct =
Yt
Y¯
, Bt =
Zt
Z¯
.
The basic model was applied to products, p, within business lines. The
bag for each product p at time t is then Bpt. It is a bottom-up model whereas
many measures used previously by banks to estimate liquidity risk have been
top-down models. The aggregate for a business line BLt is calculated as
BLt =
k∑
p=1
wpBpt
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summing over the products. From this it follows that the weights, wp, which
are not disclosed, must always satisfy
k∑
p=1
wp = 1 .
The weekly mean values were calculated. This gave rise to weekly factors with
a mean of 1, irrespective of the incidence of public holidays. The dispersion
of these weekly factors was the subject of further analysis.
4 Data distributions
The sample moments of each distribution is readily calculated from the data.
The standard deviation is the same as the coefficient of variation when the
mean is 1. The skewness and kurtosis are based on the third and fourth
moments.
The Normal Power approximation [2, Chapter 4] is used to estimate the
99.97% point of the amount distribution. This approximation to the normal
distribution, y, for the number of bags required, x, is
x− µ
σ
= y +
γ
6
(y2 − 1) + κ
24
(y3 − 3y) + γ
6
(
2y3 − 5y)+O(n−1.5) ,
where Φ(y) = 1 −  gives the normal variate in terms of its tail . Here
 = 0.03% = 0.0003 so that Φ(y) = 0.9997 = 99.97% . The inverse normal
distribution then gives y = 3.432 . The values of the mean µ, standard
deviation σ, skewness γ and kurtosis κ from the distribution of amount data
are then used to find x. The number of reserve bags is x− 1 .
The final term in the approximation indicates that any error can be made
smaller by increasing the size of the sample data, n. The use of just 35 weeks
of data to estimate probabilities at the 3 in 10,000 level involves a high degree
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Table 1: the reserves at 99.97% confidence level for the four products as
well as data on the distribution moments.
Product Pers. Savings Carded Noncarded All
Trans. A/C’s Term Dep Term Dep Retail
Mean bag, µ 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Std dev’n, σ 0.096 0.146 0.259 0.355 0.150
Skewness, γ 0.333 -0.488 1.161 1.468 0.689
Kurtosis, κ 6.372 2.086 1.454 3.573 1.976
Reserve Bags 1.138 0.692 1.284 2.397 0.945
of extrapolation as we are attempting to estimate the reserves required for
the worst week in 64 years!
Consider Table 1. The high kurtosis in the amount of personal transac-
tional withdrawal is due to an Easter effect. The term deposit withdrawals
have strong positive skewness in amount due to positive skewness in their
size. The overall reserve indicated for all products is less than the sum of
the reserves for each individual product. This is due to less than perfect
correlation for movements by all the products in the data.
5 Correlations
5.1 Correlation by amounts
The persistence of the difference in product movements should not be relied
upon when extreme circumstances are being contemplated. Examine the
correlation effect in detail shown in Table 2. The correlation of withdrawal
amounts between products is fairly high within a week, but falls away rapidly
at weekly lags 1 and 2. This indicates a propensity for high withdrawals to
occur for all products at the same time.
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Table 2: the correlation of the withdrawal amounts (in the same week)
between products
Product Pers. Savings Carded Noncarded All
Trans A/C’s Term Dep Term Dep Retail
Pers Trans 1.00 0.85 0.38 0.63 0.81
Savings A/C’s 0.85 1.00 0.28 0.49 0.69
Carded T.D. 0.38 0.28 1.00 0.51 0.79
Noncarded T.D. 0.63 0.49 0.51 1.00 0.85
All Retail 0.81 0.69 0.79 0.85 1.00
Table 3: the correlation of the number of withdrawals and their size between
products.
Product Pers. Savings Carded Noncarded All
no. vs size Trans A/C’s Term Dep Term Dep Retail
Pers Trans 0.65 0.50 -0.21 0.41 0.34
Savings A/C’s 0.58 0.13 -0.20 0.14 0.21
Carded T.D. 0.46 0.68 -0.37 0.31 0.51
Noncarded T.D. 0.78 0.60 0.10 0.51 0.83
All Retail 0.66 0.44 -0.22 0.37 0.32
5.2 Correlation between number and size of
withdrawals
Consider Table 3. The personal transactional and non-carded term deposit
products show strong positive correlations between the number and size of
the withdrawal. The other products do not conform to this pattern and the
overall result for all products is a modest 32%. Correlations of this magnitude
cannot be ignored however. An assumption of independence between number
and size of withdrawal is clearly not tenable. A real difficulty is determining
the strength of this dependence in a crisis situation, although it may be
expected to follow the worst case scenario.
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5.3 A model of which allows for dependence
The expected values of the mob, clip and bag are fixed by definition, that is,
E[Mt] = 1 , E[Ct] = 1 , E[Bt] = 1 .
It follows immediately that E[Bt] = E[Mt] × E[Ct] . However, we cannot
assume that E[Bt] = E[Mt × Ct] unless we can show that the mob and clip
are independent. We have good reason to suspect the contrary case! We may
alternatively assume that some association exists. Returning to our original
variables, let
E[Zt] = E[Nt × Yt] = ekE[Nt]× E[Yt] .
The relationship Zt = Nt × Yt is written in terms of the scaled variables as
Z¯Bt = N¯Mt × Y¯ Ct ,
giving
Bt =
N¯ Y¯
Z¯
Mt × Ct .
We now take logarithms to obtain the new equation
bt = mt + ct − k ,
where
bt = lnBt , mt = lnMt , ct = lnCt , k = ln
Z¯
N¯ Y¯
.
The value of k can be positive, zero or negative. This measure of associa-
tion is related to the coefficient of correlation between Nt and Yt and also
incorporates the effect of any skewness which may exist in either variable.
This rewritten expression might look like linear regression, but it is in
fact a linear structural equation for the data that gives equal weight to the
variations in number and size.
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5.4 Degree of association
The parameter k provides a measure of the extent to which the association
between size and number influences the total amount.
In terms of our expected values
k = ln Z¯ − ln(N¯ Y¯ ) ≈ lnE[Nt × Yt]− ln(E[Nt]× E[Yt]) .
If size and number are independent variables, then k would be close to zero.
Our sample weekly data retail products provides us with a range of examples:
• No association: Savings accounts (k = 0).
• Negative association:Carded term deposits (k = −.019).
• Positive association: Personal transactional (k = .002) and non carded
term deposits (k = .019).
This result for Savings accounts may be spurious as there is distinct
evidence of a fortnightly cycle.
5.5 Principal risk factors
Does variation in size or number of withdrawals provide the bigger risk? We
comment on each product in turn using graphical illustrations, using our
limited data. Recall that the log clip and log mob are simple measures of
size and number of withdrawals, and a scatter plot of these gives a sense of
their relationship. It can be noted too that the scales on each graph follow
naturally from our method of analysis and make comparisons easier. A wider
scatter in data points in either axis direction implies a greater degree of risk
associated with the measure along that axis.
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Figure 1:
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Figure 2:
The effect of the Easter holiday break on the Personal transactional prod-
uct is quite pronounced. For the personal transactional product both number
and size are influential (Figure 1) .
The data for the Savings account product has strong fortnightly cycle.
For this product the number of transactions is more variable than the size
(Figure 2) . There is a distinct lack of values close to the average which can
be readily explained by the fortnightly cycle.
The time series for the carded term deposit data exhibits an intertwined
pattern due to the strong negative association between number and size.
The non-carded term deposit product exhibits features that increase liq-
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Figure 3:
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Figure 4:
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uidity risk. The size and number of withdrawals has a positive association
(Figure 4) . Surprisingly, given the nature of this product, it appears that the
number of withdrawals is more influential on the liquidity risk than their size!
6 Conclusion
This bank management should be pleased with the results for carded term
deposits. The determination of the carded rates is smoothing the fluctua-
tions in the withdrawal amounts. However the result for non-carded term
deposits, often, larger deposits, must be disappointing. It seems the team of
investors who operate in this market are increasing the liquidity risk of the
bank. Perhaps the dealers are placing too much time watching movements
in the external market and not paying enough attention to the shape of the
internal book.
The structural equation developed above provides a simple inexpensive
tool for supervisory control of the on-going liquidity risk of the bank. Liq-
uidity risk can be reduced by controlling the manner in which the book is
built. It is desirable that number and size of withdrawals have a negative
association at each future date.
A methodology to calculate reserves to cover the liquidity risk has been
demonstrated. However, more data is required before any reliance can be
placed on the calculated values. Parameter estimates obtained from small
samples can contain significant biases.
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